File 911: The Failure of Prevention
Note: The World Wide Web is, like the web of a spider, ephemeral. Links shown below may have blown away, but, before giving up on them, be sure to check whether the articles can be located elsewhere via Google or have been preserved in the amber of the Internet Wayback Machine.
Richard Miniter, "Sudan's Angle" (10/8/01). Did the Clinton Administration pass up its best opportunity to stop Osama bin Laden?
Kevin M. Cherry, "Clinton Assigns Blame" (11/8/01). A new low for the man whom George Will labeled "the worst person ever to have been president". More on this topic in Ephemerides (Nov. 8, 9, 10).
Byron York, "Clinton Has No Clothes" (11/30/01). When terrorists struck, the Big He always had something more important to do.
Stanley Kurtz, "Exposing Esposito" (12/3/01). Close scrutiny of one of the academics who laid the intellectual groundwork for Clinton's Middle East policies.
Gabriel Schoenfeld, "Counterterrorism Before September 11th" (12/27/01). "Foreign terrorists were waging war on the United States, and the United States was determined, above all, not to wage war back."
Andrew Sullivan, "The AWOL President" (1/11/02). Was September 11th unforeseeable, or did the Leader of the Free World prefer not to open his eyes?
Dick Morris, "While Clinton Fiddled" (2/5/02). A White House insider's account of the last Administration's feckless approach to the terrorist threat.
Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Clinton War Spin" (2/13/02). A Naval War College professor examines what happened to the military on Clinton's watch.
Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Iraqi Connection to Oklahoma City Bombing" (3/22/02). Elements of the antisemitic Far Right have cheered the 9/11 attacks. Evidence is now emerging that they had contacts with Islamofascists before then and that Iraqi agents may have recruited murderers McVeigh and Nichols. What is clear is that, having found a domestic conspiracy, the then-Attorney General and her boss stopped looking for anything bigger.
Scott Shuger, "Failing Intelligence" (5/17/02). A series of questions - suffused with 20/20 hindsight but nonetheless worth pondering - about the inattention of American intelligence agencies to al-Qaeda's terrorist intentions and capabilities.
The Wall Street Journal, "Let Congress Do It" (5/22/02). The case against duplicating Congressional investigations with an "independent commission".
Christopher Caldwell, "Low Profile" (5/24/02). The irrational aversion to "profiling" may have played a role in preventing action based on pre-9/11 intelligence data.
Mark Riebling, "The Real Intelligence Failure" (5/28/02). The Congressionally mandated separation between foreign and domestic counterintelligence hampers anti-terrorist efforts.
Mark Steyn, "Does Political Correctness Kill?" (5/30/02). "In August, 2001, no one at the FBI or FAA or anywhere else wanted to be seen to be noticing funny behaviour by Arabs. Thousands of Americans died, at least in part, because of ethnic squeamishness by federal agencies."
Nicholas D. Kristoff, "Liberal Reality Check" (5/31/02). "As risks change, we who care about civil liberties need to realign balances between security and freedom. It is a wreching, odious task, but we liberals need to learn from 9/11 just as much as the F.B.I. does."
Mark R. Levin, "Who Blew It?" (6/3/02). Many recriminations about 9/11 have more spin than substance.
Mark Riebling, "Freeh at Last" (10/17/02). "Freeh's testimony to the Joint Intelligence Committees, though clearly intended as a defense of the FBI, actually confirmed that the bureau must indeed bear much of the blame for 9/11."
Max Boot, "The Consequences of Clintonism" (10/18/02). The North Korean nuclear fiasco is further evidence of the folly of the former President's enthrallment to "peace processes".
Mansoor Ijaz, "The Clinton Intel Record" (4/29/03). Information from captured Iraqi documents furnishes strong evidence that the Clinton Administration "politicized intelligence data, relied on and even circulated fabricated evidence in making critical national-security decisions, and presided over a string of intelligence failures during the months leading up to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Analysis of documents found in the rubble of Iraq's intelligence headquarters show that contrary to conventional wisdom, Iraqi military and intelligence officials sought out al Qaeda leaders, not the other way around, and ultimately met with bin Laden on at least two occasions. They also show that channels of communication between al Qaeda and Iraq were created much earlier and were wider ranging in scope than previously thought. The timing of the meetings sheds important new light on how grave the Clinton administration's intelligence failures may have been."