File 911: The Axis of Evil: North Korea
Note: The World Wide Web is, like the web of a spider, ephemeral. Links shown below may have blown away, but, before giving up on them, be sure to check whether the articles can be located elsewhere via Google or have been preserved in the amber of the Internet Wayback Machine.
Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., "Back in the Axis, Again" (10/17/02). A first reaction to the revelation of North Korea's failure to abide by its agreement to discontinue nuclear weapons development. "The least those like Jimmy Carter and former Clinton-administration officials - who bear much of the responsibility for allowing Kim Jong-Il's malevolent capabilities to metastasize over the past eight years, even as America's abilities to contend with war on the Korean Peninsula (let alone a second, simultaneous one elsewhere) were allowed to decay - can do is to refrain from making matters worse by insisting that President Bush continue their failed policies."
William Kristol & Gary Schmitt, "Lessons of a Nuclear North Korea" (10/18/02). "For almost a decade, the New York Times, the Clinton administration, and others have told us that the only sensible strategy for dealing with North Korea was engagement. But it hasn't worked; if anything, it has actually increased the incentives for North Korea (and like-minded states) to develop as many dangerous 'bargaining chips' as they can. This softheaded policy of engagement produces a world no one wants to live in. And certainly our current difficulty in confronting an armed North Korea shows precisely why dealing with Iraq and Saddam Hussein can't wait."
Karen Elliott House, "The Lesson of North Korea" (1/3/03). "What Pyongyang offers the world is a clear picture of the consequences of appeasement. Apologists for Saddam should see in North Korea the proof that, contrary to their wishful thinking, cajoling dictators doesn't make the world safer, but rather more dangerous."
Joshua Muravchik, "Facing Up to North Korea" (3/1/03). "Yet far from being the fault of this administration, the fix we are in is the fruit of a long pattern of appeasement and of North Korea's canny manipulation of our illusions and fears. . . . At the core of this pathetic tale was our reluctance to consider that the goal of the North Koreans' nuclear-weapons program was to possess nuclear weapons and that diplomatic and economic incentives to avert this goal might be of no avail. In place of a frank recognition of this reality, we substituted our vain hopes that North Korea's rulers could be softened by concessions, and that what they really wanted was economic aid, political legitimacy, and 'respect'."
Jonathan Rauch, "Yes, Bush Has a North Korea Policy. It Might Even Work." (3/14/03). "To the extent that North Korea succeeds in bilateralizing its disagreement with the U.S., North Korea effectively succeeds in neutralizing America's allies, or even turning them. That should be obvious to anyone who has watched recent events pertaining to Iraq. At the end of the day, a bilateral confrontation with North Korea may be inevitable. It would be foolish, however, for America to volunteer for one now."
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "China Looks Ahead to Korea Crisis" (3/18/03). A careful analysis, dependent unfortunately on unverifiable sources, of Red China's efforts to turn North Korea into a problem that the U.S. will have to handle alone.
